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THE AVAILABILITY OF EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
George N. Schlesinger 
One of the arguments to be discussed in this paper is designed to show that 
from a religious point of view a great variety of theistic proofs are to be regarded 
as objectionable. On the assumption that elementary fairness demands that all 
of us ought to be equal in the eyes of God and in particular that access to the 
one thing that really matters to the theist, the salvation reached through a God-cen-
tered life, must not vary from person to person, and on the traditional theistic 
view which postulates absolute Divine fairness, it would seem that the believer 
more even than the non-believer, should regard it imperative to find fault with 
most theistic proofs. In the course of our discussion it will become clear that 
even if this objection were valid certain kinds of proofs are immune to it. The 
first few sections of this paper are devoted to the description of such a proof 
which also happens to be pivoted on the assumption of Divine fairness. 
I shall also attempt to say something about the important general problem as 
to why most of the traditional theistic proofs, which at best point to the existence 
of some kind of a supernatural being with no more than one or two well-defined 
attributes, could have been taken to establish the existence of a full-fledged being 
endowed with all the specific attributes of the Judeo-Christian Deity. 
Many people look upon agnosticism as the most rational position to be recom-
mended to all dispassionate and enlightened people nowadays. The numerous 
attempted proofs throughout history and the equally numerous rebuttals are taken 
generally to show that theism is intrinsically an undecidable thesis and no facts 
are to be found anywhere through which its tntth or falsity could conclusively 
be established. The evidence available lends itself to different interpretations; 
objective reality offers inherently ambiguous testimony concerning the question 
of its ultimate origin. 
In the opinion of a wide group of thinkers, God's existence is a unique kind 
of fact in the sense that if it obtains no phenomena within our range carries its 
imprint and therefore the statement affirming it is essentially undecidable through 
any observation. Nor can its credibility be established through rational argument. 
Consequently, no feature of the accessible universe warrants anything but the 
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withholding of judgment concerning theism and atheism and the occupying a 
neutral, middle ground. The first half of this paper is devoted to the fairly detailed 
description of an argument showing why this widespread view is untenable. 
We shall begin by considering a person s who may be regarded as a highly 
rational agent. He is to be assumed to have heard most of the proofs that have 
been offered for the existence of God, some of which he found more interesting 
than others, but none of which appeared to him irresistible enough to compel 
him to admit that theism has high enough probability for it to be mandatory 
upon a rational person to accept. At the same time he is not aware of the existence 
of any decisive enough argument against theism which would render anything 
but actual subscription to atheism irrational. To put this in symbols, what we 
are saying is that s is an agnostic, who does not find any of the theistic proofs 
adequate and therefore: 
(a) - Bsg [ = s does not believe that God (who has the attributes 
ascribed to him traditionally) exists.] 
At the same time he does not feel entitled to go far enough as to positively 
declare that God does not exist, that is, 
(13) ~ Bs- g 
Another important characteristic of s is that he is completely dispassionate 
and open minded and is ready to change his beliefs to accord with what seems 
most reasonable to hold in the light of a new and convincing argument he may 
learn of at any time. He is also reasonable enough not to tolerate inconsistent 
beliefs. In fact if he were to discover that there was an implicit inconsistency 
among the beliefs he holds or is committed to by implication, he will abandon 
some of them so as to make the set he subscribes to, consistent. Since he 
endeavours to be as reasonable as possible, he will not act arbitrarily but will 
relinquish those beliefs that objectively appear to be least justifiable. 
Let us now suppose that s, in the course of his efforts to understand the nature 
of theism, learns that according to all the major versions of theism in the different 
periods of history, it is a central part of the Divine plan to have created human 
beings so that they may respond to him. Theists of different denominations 
believe that we have been placed upon this earth in order to dedicate ourselves 
to the realization of His will by observing all religious precepts. Religious acts 
are the means that bring us close to the source of all perfections and enable us 
to achieve our own perfection. Those who fail to live a Divine centered life, 
e.g. by denying altogether His existence, are bound to remain incomplete, trun-
cated creatures and will utimately suffer accordingly. 
Thinking over these data leads s to the discovery, a discovery that has been 
made by many before, that theism seems to harbor a contradiction, namely, that 
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a being who is perfectly fair, determines unfairly His creatures' fate. The Scrip-
tures declare 'All His ways are justice' and even in Natural Theology alone, His 
perfection implies that He is absolutely just. Now people with a natural sense 
of justice might be willing to concede that it is not unjust that persons who 
believe in God and His commandments, yet neglect their religious duties, should 
as a result be subject to suffering. But what about an honest agnostic, who has 
dispassionately examined all the evidence available to him and concluded that 
there is no sufficient rational basis for theistic belief? Surely it should be contrary 
to Divine Justice to punish such a person; how is it even thinkable that He would 
punish someone who did not sin willfully? Being an assiduous searcher of the 
truth, as we said he was, he seeks at the earliest possible moment to consult 
knowledgeable theologian T on this matter, to find out how he proposes to 
resolve this problem. The theologian T offers him the following, by no means 
startlingly novel, explanation: 
The world is charged with the grandeur of God and anyone with a minimal 
amount of good will cannot, after having acquired some knowledge of the nature 
of the universe and having reflected upon the elementary characteristics of a 
Divine Being, hold consistently with rationality and reasonableness that anything 
but a full belief in the existence of God is warranted. 
Consequently those who are mature enough to have become aware to some 
extent of the splendor of nature and the nobility of faith and yet refuse to embrace 
theism, must be people who find religious discipline unendurable and will there-
fore do everything to render their conscious mind oblivious to the basis of such 
discipline. Thus they are going to engage in a willful suppression of the theistic 
belief that has been implanted in their hearts and distort their natural thought 
processes so as not to see what they are reluctant to see, and regard well supported 
what they are anxious to have well supported. Obviously these people do not 
merely erase religious faith from their awareness but uproot all the traces from 
their minds that they have done any such erasure. These people will, of course, 
suffer the consequences of their disbelief, but in view of the manner in which 
they have promoted their state of mind, it is not to be viewed as any injustice 
being perpetrated upon them. 
Some theologians view the attitude of this class of people in less drastic terms. 
They would not suggest that the members of this class have necessarily uprooted 
a belief that was already entrenched in their minds. But as William James has 
explained in his famous The Will To Believe, the convictions we acquire in the 
first place are to a considerable degree shaped by our own desires. We are 
selective in attending to evidence, avoid certain influences and subject ourselves 
to others. It is possible for a person who is loath to submit to Divine authority 
to direct subtly his own investigations in such a manner that he is more likely 
to come across evidence hostile to theism than he would otherwise, and manage 
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to overlook most of what may be construed as supporting religious faith. 
Also, more liberal theologians will not describe the subsequent loss members 
of this category are to endure, as vengeance wrought upon them or as constituting 
well deserved Divine retribution, but rather as an inevitable outcome of their 
own act. The salvation in store for the righteous is by its very nature something 
that cannot be partaken of by those who have deliberately alienated themselves 
from the Divine and who have freely chosen a way of life that leads them away 
from where religious fulfillment is to be found. 
Be that as it fllay, any theist should find it difficult to deny that the faithless 
are bound to suffer some kind of loss. After all it is the core of all religious 
thought that a God-centered life is the sublimest kind of existence. Hence those 
who fail to embrace it inevitably deprive themselves of the greatest means for 
self-enhancement. 
The theist is bound to rule out the existence of people who with all the good 
will at their disposal are incapable of seeing the truth of religion. If there were 
such people then of necessity they would either have to endure the loss of 
something precious or they would not have to. The latter is ruled out, as we 
have said, because there is bound to be some kind of self-enrichment which can 
be achieved exclusively by religious worship only. But if the former were true, 
we would have an intolerable violation of Divine Justice. Ergo, there are no 
such people. 
This defense of Divine Justice has been held in varying forms by traditional 
theologians of all generations. It is quite clearly stated for instance in Romans 
I, 18-20 where Paul says of the non-believers that" ... they are stifling the truth. 
For all that may be known of God by men lies plain before their eyes" and warns 
that since there is no room for a plea of ignorance" ... there is no possible defense 
for their conduct." The Abingdon Bible commentary explains that according to 
Paul one needs no revelation in order to become fully aware of God's existence, 
for Paul believes in natural religion and maintains that the only explanation for 
those who refuse to submit to Divine authority is that "Men ... have been willfully 
blinded to the evidence of God. They have suppressed living truth with impunity." 
We shall assume that s is capable of understanding this fairly simple theological 
explanation and in view of our previous description of the kind of person he is, 
he is bound to find it very reasonable. Let me hasten to point out that what he 
will find 'reasonable' at this moment is not the proposition that God exists. At 
any rate he is not going to find it more reasonable now than he found it before 
he discovered what seemed to him an inconsistency in Theism. His Agnosticism 
may therefore be said to remain at precisely the same degree as it was before 
that discovery. What he will find very reasonable is that if God exists then the 
explanation given by the Theist corresponds to the truth. The explanation seems 
completely successful in preserving Divine Justice. The only people who will 
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persevere in their disbelief are people whom it makes good sense to regard as 
sinners and deserving Divine retribution. Nor should it appear absurd nowadays 
after Freud that people hold beliefs they find too repugnant consciously to 
acknowledge and which they succeed in completely repressing. 
Thus, according to T it is inherent in the very meaning of g by virtue of its 
reference to an absolutely perfect being who among other things must be assumed 
to be completely fair, that this being is not one to condone anyone suffering loss 
through no fault of his own. T is not unaware that some people have been singled 
out to endure poverty, disease and pain during their earthly passage but that does 
not present for him the same kind of problem. These bodily afflictions, (as well 
as such spiritual ones as the failure to be anointed to the High Priesthood or 
entrusted with a prophetic mission), he believes, amount to no more than tempo-
rary setbacks. In the final count T is convinced that everything will balance out 
perfectly. One who believes in an afterlife is in a position to postulate that 
whatever inconveniences an individual may have to put up with here and now, 
he will be duly compensated for in the world to come. T may well insist that 
no permanent loss is involved by whatever one is deprived of during one's brief 
sojourn in this shadowy place in which we are destined to spend the first stage 
of our existence. But on the other hand, when we are talking about losing what 
is ultimately in store for the righteous that is, about being deprived of a proper 
afterlife itself, then of course we are talking about a final, irrevocable loss. 
In order to avoid the possibility of this kind of real loss by anyone inculpable 
T is forced to postulate that the just being he worships can be relied upon to 
make His existence known to all well-disposed people. Our friend s hearing this 
is bound to realize that (-y) (g & Ws) --. Bsg 
must be true. In other words, T's explanation directly implies that in case g is 
true as well as Ws, that is, s is well-disposed, then it inevitably follows that s 
believes that g. 
It will be seen at once, however, that (n) in conjuction with ('Y) implies by 
Modus Tollens that - (g & Ws) or that - g v - Ws. In other words one must 
conclude either that g is false or that Ws is false. In the first case the Deity as 
conceived by T (who is absolutely perfect thus absolutely fair) does not exists 
and (13) is to be withdrawn. In the second case hard as it may be for s to swallow, 
he must abandon (n) realizing that the reason he could find no evidence for 
theism is that he forced himself to overlook everything that pointed toward its 
truth. 
II 
We began our discussion by stating that s, like many enlightened people 
nowadays, thought our universe warrants no other position but agnosticism since 
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objective reality offers no clear evidence indicating the existence of a supernatural 
being. Now, however, T is in the position to prove to s that his attitude is 
untenable. He can show that there is no basis for claiming that theism is inherently 
undecidable by rational means based on objective features of the world. T may 
well insist that our surroundings are replete with facts through which the status 
of religious belief may conclusively be established. 
Now it goes without saying that (-y) cannot be the subject of any dispute. Its 
truth is guaranteed by definiton; T interprets g in such a manner that it entails 
that God ensures that all well-disposed people believe in him. Assuming absolute 
fairness Ws -+ Bsg, and thus s realizes that since in fact - Bsg, either - Ws 
or else - g is true. 
The crucial point is that whichever disjunct turns out to be true it is decidedly 
not the case that reality is neutral concerning the status of theism. For in case 
Ws is false there must be plenty of evidence all around us pointing conclusively 
to the truth of g but s is not the well-disposed person he thought he was, thus 
failing to see what was in front of his eyes. He is intelligent and open-minded 
enough to understand that it is characteristic of all those who suppress any 
favorable clue from their consciousness that they genuinely lack all memory 
traces of such clues or of the act of its erasure. Such mental episodes are not 
detectable in principle. An avowedly loving husband can be made by a skillful 
psychiatrist to be confronted with indirect evidence to convince him that he 
harbors very well suppressed hostile sentiments towards his wife. 
The alternative is to say that W s is true in which case the reason why s could 
find nothing decisive in favor of g is because indeed no such evidence exists 
anywhere. In the present context, however, this fact must not be construed as 
the neutrality of the universe with respect to the truth of religion. T is committed 
to the view that if contrary to his existing conviction, the universe did not contain 
conclusive evidence in support of g that itself amounted to decisive evidence 
that g was false. It is his conviction that Divine justice is incompatible with the 
creation of a universe that did not contain sufficiently convincing evidence 
available to all testifying to His existence. It follows from the theological expla-
nation leading to (-y) that a universe devoid of easily accessible observational 
data affirming God's existence is a universe which bears positive testimony in 
support of atheism. Thus s is left with the problem to ponder as to what the 
objective nature of reality is: does it in fact speak clearly and loudly of a Divine 
creator except that he has shut his ears so as not to hear the distinct message, 
or does it decisively confirm atheism by its glaring omission to offer clear 
evidence for theism? 
It is to be noted that we do not admit a third possibility, namely, (- g & 
- Ws). It would be irrational to declare Ws false, given that s holds entirely 
honestly the firm conviction that he is well-disposed. It is only when no other 
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alternative is left that it is reasonable to assert that ~ Ws. Now if g is true, then, 
as has been argued, it follows that conclusive evidence in support of g must be 
readily available. Hence s has no option but to concede that his failure to see 
this can in no other way be accounted for but reluctantly postulating ~ Ws. 
However, if ~ g, then there is no good reason for saying that, contrary to 
significant prima facie evidence, that is contrary to s's very strongly held belief, 
he is not well-disposed. 
III 
It is not possible to take our next step before we have clarified to some extent 
an important consideration that should enter into one's deliberations as to which 
one of the many religious hypotheses to adopt. 
Let g' = a supernatural, but not fully perfect, being exists, while 'g' stands 
for traditional Theism postulating the existence of an absolutely perfect being. 
I should like to begin first by citing briefly a few reasons why if everything else 
was equal, then upon being confronted with the choice between g and g' the 
first should appear preferable. 
Various traditional arguments for the existence of God, notably the Argument 
from Design, the Cosmological Argument and Pascal's Wager, succeed at most 
in showing that there is some being behind the physical universe, without showing 
that he has the attributes ascribed to him by the Judeo-Christian tradition. The 
Argument from Design, for instance, tries to impose upon us the belief in a very 
powerful (but not necessarily omnipotent) and intelligent (but not necessarily 
omniscient) being, but seems to carry no implications concerning such questions 
as to whether he is merciful, forgiving or just. The fact that nevertheless these 
proofs have played such a large role in theological discussions shows that it was 
always assumed that if they yield any result at all they are bound to yield a belief 
in a Divine being with the characteristics of traditional theism. Thus a survey 
of the history of Theistic proofs show that at least as a matter of fact 'g' has 
always been regarded as superior to 'g" and that is why the proof of the existence 
of a mere supernatural being as such, if it were to succeed, would be regarded 
adequate. 
Another point worth remarking upon concerning g and g' is the attitude of the 
various opponents of theism and attempted theistic proofs. There have been 
many objections, for instance, against the Argument from Design. One objection 
has been based on the claim that there is no justification for postulating a designer 
when from an objective point of view the universe cannot be said to display any 
design, apart from the design we subjectively ascribe to it. Another objection 
has been that the argument gratuitously assumes that the universe in its entirety 
which of course is a unique system, may be compared to the various physical 
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systems contained in the universe many of which are known to be the results of 
intelligent design and may be ascertained to be such through certain characteristics 
they display. Virtually all the objections to the argument question one or another 
of the assumptions of the theist. Surely a more effective way of attacking the 
argument would have been to grant the theist all the presuppositions he deems 
reasonable and point out that even then his conclusion does not follow. Thus 
the most powerful attack would have been not to question whether there is actual 
design displayed by the universe itself or any of the other assumptions, but to 
point out that even if all the premises needed are conceded to be reasonable, 
nothing follows to help us to decide between g and g'. Interestingly enough this 
happens not to be the most commonly adopted line of attack, which seems to 
show that many simply take it for granted that g is preferable to g'. In other 
words, in general the atheist is prepared to concede that should all other alterna-
tives be proven incredible and the sole question that remains to be decided 
whether we are to adopt g or g', then we are to adopt g. 
Someone who is of the opinion that the methodology applicable when faced 
with the need to choose a religious hypothesis is essentially similar to the 
methodology employed by scientists, might offer a plausible explanation to 
account for the attitude just described. In science, generally the situation is such 
that no matter how large our body of observational data, if we can find some 
hypothesis accounting for all the data, we shall also be able to find an indefinitely 
large set of alternative hypotheses, capable of accounting just as well for the 
same data. To escape indecision we adopt the principle of simplicity and we 
adopt the simplest of all such hypotheses. There exists a vast literature concerning 
this basic issue, many aspects of which are yet to be settled. There is no agreement 
among philosophers, for instance, whether it is correct to assume that the simplest 
of all hypotheses that are identically related to all the observations is actually of 
higher probability or that our preference is based on some other consideration. 
Nor is there agreement on the question of the correct application of the notion 
of simplicity. However, very few people would wish to deny the overall validity 
as well as the universal importance of the principle. 
In the case of hypotheses postulating the existence of a deity it might be argued 
that the less it takes to offer a complete statement of a particular hypothesis the 
simpler that hypothesis is to be regarded. g' of course refers to an infinitely large 
number of hypotheses, some very encumbered, but even the least encumbered 
cannot be as briefly stated as g. The remarkable idea that 'absolutely perfect' is 
a unique predicate since it implies all the other predicates traditionally regarded 
as constitutive of the definition of God-one of the most strikingly simple and 
also great ideas produced in the whole history of western civilization-is of 
course due to St. Anselm. Thus, the brief statement g offers a complete description 
of the Deity it postulates. On the basis of g alone it is possible to determine for 
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any property P, whether the being in question does or does not possess it. If 
having P adds to the excellence of its possessor then an absolutely perfect being 
has P, otherwise He does not have it. On the other hand, even the simplest 
member of g*, for example one which postulates an absolutely perfect being 
except that He is not absolutely just, would not be a complete statement without 
some further description specifying the precise sense in which he may be unjust. 
It might seem for a moment that this argument fails since one is forced to 
admit that it is by nQ means obvious with respect to every property whether it 
adds to or detracts from the excellence of its possessor. It is usually assumed 
for instance, that omniscience is an admirable quality. Some might, however, 
argue that a being whose knowledge is forever incomplete and who is constantly 
seeking to increase it and thus never ceases from inquring and learning, is to be 
more admired than one who needs no studying at all and is hence of higher 
excellence and perfection than the former, and so on. A follower of St. Anselm, 
however, could reply to a given property P whether it is an advantage or a 
liability to possess it, but not that in fact it is not fully determined what the true 
nature of P is. He might even go further and contend that it is even knowable 
in principle whether P is of positive of negative value. He might claim that a 
careful, thorough analysis would reveal that in the light of the various value 
judgments to which a person is already committed, it is required for the sake of 
coherence that he should ascribe a positive or negative value to P. Irrespective 
of whether one finds this contention plausible or not, it will have to be conceded 
that it is not easy to think of how one might go about refuting the contention. 
On the Anselmian view then it would have to be agreed that g could be 
reasonably regarded as the simplest of all the hypotheses postulating a supernatural 
being who created and keeps looking after our universe. Sound methodology 
may be claimed to demand that if everything else was equal, g is to be preferred 
to all its rivals. 
A somewhat more profound argument would begin by posing the question: 
what are the factors that are relevant in determining the degree to which it is 
rational for a person to commit himself to the existence of a given deity? It 
seems that the rationality of one's commitment is the function of two variables; 
first of all the higher the probability of the statement asserting the deity's exis-
tence, the more rational it should be to commit oneself to that deity's existence. 
Secondly, the reasonableness of one's commitment should also increase with 
the greater excellence and hence worshippability of the deity in question. The 
situation is comparable to the one obtained in ordinary betting events. The degree 
of rationality of betting on a given outcome depends not only on its probability 
but also on the price associated with that outcome. The gambler's objective is 
monetary gain; consequently the amount of prospective gain as well as the degree 
of likelihood of a favored outcome playa role in determining the reasonableness 
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of a certain bet. Indeed the degree of attraction of a given bet is measured by 
the expectations associated with it, which is the product of the probability of 
success and the reward it carries. Therefore in the special case where several 
outcomes are equiprobable, the outcome carrying the highest reward is to be 
rationally preferred. 
In a parallel fashion an individual seeking a deity to worship aims at gaining 
some great religious benefit. Consequently the answer to the question of which 
deity should attract more one's commitment is determined by the likelihood of 
that deity's existence as well as by His capacity of granting greater religious 
value to the worshipper. The magnitude of that value is a function of the worship-
pability he possesses. g clearly postulates a being with maximum worshippability. 
In the present context too, in the special case where different hypotheses are 
supported by identical evidence the outcome carrying the greatest satisfaction is 
rationally to be preferred. Thus reason dictates that g is to be preferred to any 
of its rivals. 
It should be emphasized that the foregoing argument does not pre-suppose a 
mercenary attitude on the part of the religious seeker toward the choices con-
fronting him. After all the value to be gained in the present context is of a 
sublime nature and only a highminded person would endeavor to pursue it. The 
benefit our agent is supposed to be after is nothing but the deeper satisfaction 
that comes from the knowledge that the object of his worship highly deserves 
to be worshipped. 
We may thus enunciate a straightforward principle that should govern all 
rational agents in quest of religious faith, that is parallel to the principle governing 
rational behaviour in common betting situations. In the latter case, as we know, 
we have: 
Expectations associated with h = Probability that h x Reward in case 
h turns out to be true. 
The appropriate parallel expression is: 
(W): Degree of justified inclination to worship D = Probability that D 
exists x Degree of Worshippability of D 
The particular collorary of Principle (W) that is of special interest for our purposes 
involves the situation in which reason requires us to assign equal probabilities 
to the existence of, say, D\ and Dz, as when the relevant evidence is precisely 
the same in both cases. It is clear that in such a situation, regardless of whether 
the probabilities are small or large, as long as they do not equal zero or one, 
since the value is determined solely by the second factor, a person's attitude 
will be shaped entirely by the relative degrees of worshippability ofD 1 and D2 . 
Now we come to the point of this section, which is T's argument that s is 
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obliged to abandon the middle position he has taken up and move toward 
embracing theism. Let g,' = An almost perfect being exists who (in particular) 
lacks complete justice. 
Suppose s is agnostic with respect to g' as well and hence the counterparts of 
(a) and ([3) are also true i.e. 
(a') ~ Bsg' and ([3') ~ Bs ~ g' 
Does it inevitably follow that he has to accept also 
("0 (g' & Ws) ---. Bsg'? 
Clearly the answer is no. We recall that we are forced to accept (,y) because it 
was incompatible with perfect justice that His existence should not be evident 
to well-disposed individuals. But g' refers to a being who is not absolutely just 
and thus ('Y') need not be postulated in order to render g' consistent. 
Now it seems reasonable to claim that before being apprised of T's account 
concerning the availability to evidence in support of religious belief s was able 
to hold the following views concerning what theism actually amounts to: 
(a) It requires a person to hold on to his faith even without being able 
to resolve the difficulty concerning Divine fairness and in spite of it. 
(b) Theism is in fact correctly expressed by one of the propositions 
belonging to g' in which case no puzzlement arises in the first place. 
In case (a): the fact that the problem of fairness continues to be hanging over 
religious belief affects to some extent its credibility of theism. Given however 
Principle (W) and that the evidence relevant to g is identical to that which is 
relevant to g' and thus they are confirmed precisely to the same degree, it is 
reasonable to have higher inclination to accept g than g'. 
It is plausible to suggest that if s, like many other people unfamiliar with T's 
thesis, has regarded himself earlier to be occupying a position equidistant from 
the two extremities involving religious belief, then T's explanation should cause 
him to shift somewhat in the direction of theism, regardless of whether his 
previous position was (a) or (b). After all, had (a) been the case then the first 
of the factors of the right-hand side of (W), the credibility of theism, would 
have been lower than what it has become now, and if (b) had been true then the 
second factor, the degree of worshippability of the Divine being postulated, 
would have been less than it is now. 
IV 
The foregoing argument is clearly of a somewhat restricted scope. Our friend 
s clearly subscribes to certain presuppositions are not shared by everyone. 
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Relevant to our argument among these is his belief that in the context of the 
commonly known evidence rationality should place a person in a position that 
is precisely midway between theism and its definite denial and that Divine 
perfection presupposes equal and readily available access to evidence in support 
of religious belief. Clearly our argument does not work for an individual who 
is not willing to make these assumptions. In addition to that, and more impor-
tantly, some might conclude that even given all of s's assumptions the conclusion 
I have reached is of little interest. After all what I could claim is no more than 
the seemingly weak assertion that a person with s's attitude is obliged to be 
slightly more inclined toward an acceptance of g than its complete rejection. 
Does anything much follow from this? 
It is crucial to realize, however, not only in the present context, but indeed 
in the context of great many other theistic arguments as well, that one may 
reasonably contend that the conclusion I have reached is by no means weak. 
It is a basic principle of epistemology that in general a person is not justified 
in positively embracing p or affirming the truth of p unless the likelihood of p 
can reasonably be claimed to be very high. While it may not be obvious how 
much support is required for p before a rational person is permitted or required 
to subscribe to p, one would hardly claim that in the context of such weak 
evidence makes the probability that p only slightly more than half, p is acceptable. 
Thus, in general there are three possibilities-first when the probability of p is 
higher than n (where n is according to most people closer to 1 than to 1/2 ), in 
which case reason requires the acceptance of p. Second, when the probability 
that p is false is more than n which is a situation that demands the acceptance 
of not-po Third, the remaining cases in which one is to stay neutral with respect 
to a commitment either to p or to not-po Staying neutral means withholding 
judgments and implies not merely that one neither asserts p nor not-p, but that 
one refrains from all actions the success of which presuppose the truth of p or 
the falsity of p. This means that one should avoid situations in which one must 
act either on assuming p or on assuming not-po 
Such an attitude of neutrality is possible with respect to a large set of propos-
itions. For example, in the case of 'Fred is a suitable candidate for the chairman-
ship of the board of directors' if I positively embrace it then it may be reasonable 
that I should vote for Fred. On the other hand, if I have sufficient reason to 
believe that the proposition is false, I ought to vote against him. Otherwise I 
should withhold judgment, which in this case amounts to refraining from any 
vote. Or if 'p' = 'i is a reasonably priced useful product,' then positive acceptance 
implies that whenever I should be in the need of that kind of product I should 
not refrain from buying it, while the rejection of p may imply among other 
things, that upon being requested to sign a petition to ban i from the market I 
should not feel obliged to refuse. A position of neutrality in this case should 
EVIDENCE AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF 433 
imply my abstaining from all such positive and negative acts with respect to i. 
It may in general be claimed that toward any p that is a down-to-earth empirical 
statement concerning a limited segment of reality the three attitudes mentioned 
are possible, but not toward very basic propositions, propositions that are all 
embracing, affecting every aspect of existence. I have claimed elsewhere for 
instance that with respect to the claim concerning the validity of induction it is 
impossible to remain completely neutral. It is impossible to withhold judgment 
about all empirical statements and refrain from relevant acts accordingly since 
it is impossible for an inhabitant of the universe to abstain from all actions 
presupposing an empirical hypothesis, e.g. avoid standing here because of the 
uncertain security ofthis place, and at the same time also avoid standing anywhere 
else too. 
Similarly, g is very different from the two propositions considered earlier. 
The basic epistemological principle I have mentioned does not apply to g. If g 
is true then a vast number of special activities must occupy the central part of 
every person's life. One either engages in these activities as demanded by g or 
one fails to do so and thereby positively violates the implications of g. There 
just is no middle way in which one neither positively practice what is demanded 
by g nor positively violates it. The epistemic principle which recognises three 
possible attitudes toward a given proposition cannot apply in the context of a 
proposition like g. Thus given that there exists no way of action which would 
reflect a truly neutral position the theist may therefore reasonably claim that here 
the rule must be that positive acceptance is rationally required either of g or -g 
as soon as there is any evidence or argument pointing more in one direction than 
the other. 
v 
Further brief reflection upon T's argument, which led to the formulation of 
(8) should reveal a basic objection that may be levelled against most attempted 
theistic proofs. This is an objection one comes across from time to time, yet for 
some reason a fully articulated statement of it is hard to find anywhere in the 
literature. Remarkably enough, the objection is such that it is not even necessary 
to examine in full detail a given proof in order to raise the objection against it. 
Furthermore, strange as it may sound initially, the more ingenious and the more 
convincing the proof the stronger the objection seems to apply. 
As we saw, T is committed to the commonsense view that it would be incom-
patible with Divine justice if any individual suffered a loss due to his failure to 
conduct himself religiously, in case his lack of faith was not entirely a result of 
his freely willed choice but due to accidental, external circumstances. This 
implies that all human beings are entitled to be given the same opportunities and 
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that access to convincing evidence for theism should be equally available to all, 
and not vary with an individual's accidental circumstances. Suppose I am a 
non-believer who has hitherto resisted all the theistic arguments that I could lay 
my hands on; however, there exists a particular superior theistic proof which I 
could grasp and which I would find entirely convincing, but it just so happens 
that I shall never have the opportunity to learn about it. Is it fair that I should 
lose everything that according to a theologian really matters simply because of 
such unfortunate circumstances that are not my doing? Furthermore, should any 
of the truly convincing proofs be particularly ingenious and complex-like some 
contemporary versions of the ontological proof that require a good mastery of 
modal logic-then it requires a high degree of intelligence to understand it. It 
is very hard to reconcile with an elementary sense of fairness-no less than s 
found it hard to accept the fact that anyone is to suffer the consequences of his 
non-belief-that those capable of mastering elaborate logical arguments stand a 
much better chance of attaining spiritual salvation than their less fortunately 
endowed fellow beings. In addition, of course, concerning any novel proof that 
may have been lately constructed we may well wonder about all the previous 
generations who were not lucky enough to survive and have the chance to be 
informed of such proofs which could have saved them? 
In the light of these objections T may point out that his argument has the 
unique advantage of not being involved in any such difficulties. It is central to 
T's argument that the real evidence for theism be constantly present in front of 
our eyes and that it speak clearly so that every individual is capable of under-
standing it irrespective of his innate logical talents or the amount of training he 
has had or the knowledge he happens to possess. All that T's argument sets out 
to demonstrate is how an individual who has willfully suppressed his belief that 
g, maintaining that the universe contains no firm evidence in favor or against 
it, can be made aware of the error of his position. But then to a person who in 
fact has certain beliefs in his subconscious mind and is genuinely desirous to 
bring those to the surface of his conscious awareness, indefinitely many ways 
are available to achieve this end. Different psychologists will recommend different 
approaches depending on the patients personal history, temperament and predilec-
tions. T's argument is of special interest only because it provides a general, 
logical method of changing a person's beliefs which does not require a personal 
acquaintance with that person and is entirely independent of his individual data 
and the circumstances of his life. 
It should seem therefore possible for T to maintain that his proofs cannot be 
a source of unfair discrimination with respect to the success in obtaining religious 
enlightment. The reason is that three kinds of individuals are possible: those for 
whom any sort of proof like T's is superfluous; those for whom his proof may 
be of help but then for those people many other means at least as effective are 
EVIDENCE AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF 435 
available as well and finally those who will find it entirely useless. The first 
category consists of well disposed people who require no help from any 
philosopher or theologian since they can clearly hear "the heaven speak of His 
glory and the firmament His handiwork." The second category contains indi-
viduals who are anxious not to see God's existence proven to them but who are 
open-minded enough to entertain the thought that they may be victims of self-
deception and are prepared to make genuine efforts to discover whether or not 
they have any suppressed beliefs. Members of this category resemble those of 
the first category in that T's proof is dispensible to them since these people do 
not need T's proof in particular as there are any number of therapeutic methods 
whereby a person becomes aware of suppressed thoughts, many of which may 
be self-administered and require no more than an honest, thorough-going interpre-
tation. The third category consists of really resolute non-believers who are not 
willing genuinely to contemplate the possibility of self-deception. These people 
will not subject themselves to a painstaking self-scrutiny and therefore T's argu-
ment will be of no help to them either. Presented with (a) and (8), and hence 
with the disjunction that either ~ g or ~ Ws they will insist on being in a 
position of knowing for sure that they have no suppressed beliefs and that they 
have constantly kept their eyes wide open for possible evidence and have dispas-
sionately examined all arguments they have heard. 
It should be added that T's proof need not be looked upon as the one and only 
proof in existence that escapes the objection based on Divine fairness. Advocates 
of the Argument from Design for instance might make a good case for saying 
that even some of the most recent and highly sophisticated versions of their proof 
creates no problems as to how God could have permitted that an argument beyond 
the reach of so many should see the light of day. They may well contend that 
even in its most elaborate form the argument is ultimately no more than a 
rigorous, detailed articulation of reasoning available to the most primitive mind. 
It requires no sophistication at all, defenders of the argument would contend, to 
see that the wondrous phenomena surrounding us cannot but be the design of a 
Supreme being. It is only that the more sophisticated a person, the more he may 
be capable of explaining the logical reasons for why those phenomena may be 
legitimately taken as confirming Divine design. 
I am not sure, however, that a more radical reply to the objection from Divine 
fairness may not be available, a reply which will permit the construction of any 
sort of theistic proof at any time. The reply would be based on the shared 
presupposition that elementary fairness demands that everyone should be given 
the same chance to obtain religious salvation and that in particular the amount 
of good will required in order to see the truth of theism should not vary from 
individual to individual. At the same time one need not agree that this implies 
that every evidence and proof must therefore be equally available to everyone. 
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We must remember that different people have been created with different temp-
eraments and what rationally appeals to one person does not necessarily do so 
to another. Some people are greatly impressed by arguments based on concrete 
tangible and visible evidence even if the argument is not one hundred percent 
rigorous; others have a special predilection for abstract reasoning. Also the 
amount of persuasion required very much depends on the general climate of 
opinion in which an individual may find himself. In a generation in which certain 
presuppositions made by all in earlier times are no longer taken for granted, a 
proof may be required for that for which in the past no one required a proof. 
To put it briefly therefore: the different availability of proofs for theism need 
not be interpreted as signs of discrimination, since it may be necessary to com-
pensate for the initial differences that may exist in the mental and emotional 
facilities of different individuals and in the conditioning he has inevitably under-
gone in the society of which he is a member. 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen that a sufficiently open-minded person in the sense of one 
prepared to admit that one can have no guarantee that one does not have certain 
suppressed beliefs too repugnant to him to hold consciously, may be shown that 
the assumption that complete fairness is a necessary property of a perfect Divine 
being gives rise to an argument that should make him lean toward theism. 
We have also seen that the traditional, Anselmian theistic proposition is unique 
among the infinitely many propositions that postulates a supernatural creator and 
supervisor of human affairs and that by virtue of its very meaning rationality 
demands that one's tendency to embrace that particular proposition i.e. to embrace 
g, should be greater than the tendency to embrace a belief in any other kind of 
deity. 
Finally, we have had a brief discussion of an argument as to why the theist 
himself may have good reasons, based on the assumption of complete Divine 
fairness, to try to invalidate most of the alleged proofs for the existence. Strange 
as it may sound at first, according to this argument, the more persuasive and 
the more decisive the proof is claimed to be, the more reason for the theist to 




1. I am indebted to Professor T. V. Morris for the enlightening discussions we have had on the 
subject of this paper. 
